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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 The claimant, Martha Keating, appeals from a Benefits Review 
Board decision affirming an Administrative Law Judge's order 
rejecting her petition for modification.  Her claim for Black 
Lung benefits as the surviving spouse of John Keating has a 
shamefully long history.  It has been before three different ALJs 
and before the Board on three separate occasions.  Although given 
several chances to consider properly Mrs. Keating's claim for 
survivor benefits, the ALJs and the Board repeatedly failed to do 
so.  Instead, they dismissed her persistence as merely shopping 
for a "friendly factfinder."  It is not apparent from the record 
whether she was shopping for a friendly factfinder or just a fair 
one.  It is painfully obvious, however, that she found neither. 
Today, we will end this travesty.  Based on the uncontradicted 
evidence conceded by the Director to be credible,0 we conclude 
that the record establishes that Mrs. Keating is entitled to 
survivor benefits.  We will grant the petition for review, 
                                                           
0The Director's Brief provides that: 
 
We have no quarrel with Keating as to the credibility 
of the lay evidence.  We accept the facts asserted as 
true. 
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reverse the decision of the Board, and remand the cause for the 
limited purpose of awarding Mrs. Keating benefits from August of 
1978.0  
I. 
 Nearly seventeen years ago, in February 1979, Mrs. Keating 
filed for survivor benefits under the Federal Black Lung Benefits 
Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, as the surviving widow of miner John 
Keating, who died on July 19, 1978.  
Benefits are provided under the Act for or on behalf of 
miners who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 
or who were totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at 
the time of death . . . . 
20 C.F.R. § 718.204(a).  The Department of Labor denied the claim 
and she requested a formal hearing before an ALJ.  ALJ Marcellino 
(ALJ 1) held a hearing in December 1980, at which Mrs. Keating 
offered lay witness testimony and her husband's death 
certificate, but no medical evidence.0  ALJ 1 denied benefits in 
April 1981.  
 ALJ 1 found that John Keating worked as a miner for various 
periods from 1939 through 1953.  He worked part-time after school 
and on weekends in the "dog hole" mines from 1939 to 1942, for 
                                                           
0Mrs. Keating requests benefits beginning with the month after 
the miner's death, August 1978.  Section 725.503(c), 20 C.F.R., 
provides: 
 
Except as is provided in Part 727 of this subchapter, 
in the case of a survivor of a miner who died due to or 
while totally disabled by pneumoconiosis, benefits 
shall be payable beginning with the month of the 
miner's death, or January 1, 1974, whichever is later. 
0 Lack of available medical evidence was explained, in part, 
because a coroner, who was not a medical doctor, signed the death 
certificate and because the two doctors who periodically treated 
John Keating were both dead and their records not obtainable. 
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which ALJ 1 credited the deceased with one year of employment. 
The Director conceded seven years of coal mine employment from 
1946 to 1953.  Hence, ALJ 1 credited the deceased with a total of 
eight years as a miner and found that Mrs. Keating was not 
entitled to any presumptions under the Act, because the deceased 
had fewer than ten years of coal mine employment.  
 According to ALJ 1, "the death certificate conclusively 
establishe[d] that the cause of death was acute cardiac and 
respiratory failure, with anthracosilicosis contributing to 
death."  He stated that lack of evidence to show pneumoconiosis 
was either:  1) a multiple cause of death not medically 
distinguishable from the cause of death, or 2) related to or an 
aggravating cause of death, prevented a finding that Keating died 
from pneumoconiosis.  Therefore, Mrs. Keating would have to prove 
that, at the time of his death, Keating suffered total disability 
as a result of pneumoconiosis from coal mine employment. 
 ALJ 1 then mistakenly decided that because Mrs. Keating was 
not entitled to any presumptions she could not prove 
pneumoconiosis solely by lay testimony, stating  
[w]hile the lay testimony of a widow and persons with 
knowledge of the miner's condition could in some cases 
establish a presumption of pneumoconiosis, where the 
miner has less than ten years of coal mine employment 
this evidence is simply insufficient to establish the 
existence of pneumoconiosis. 
(Emphasis added).  Incongruously, the ALJ found the death 
certificate alone competent to conclusively establish the cause 
of death, acute cardiac and respiratory failure with 
anthracosilicosis with emphysema contributing to death, but not 
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competent to establish pneumoconiosis.  ALJ 1 denied Mrs. 
Keating's claim without considering the properly submitted lay 
evidence. 
 Mrs. Keating appealed the Decision and Order of ALJ 1 to the 
Board.  Mrs. Keating argued that ALJ 1 erred by finding fewer 
than ten years of coal mine employment and by not giving proper 
weight to the lay testimony and death certificate.  Almost three 
years later, the Board affirmed the denial of benefits, affirmed 
the finding of fewer than ten years of coal mine employment, and 
stated that it could not say the ALJ unreasonably determined that 
the lay evidence of record alone was insufficient to establish 
either death or total disability from pneumoconiosis.  ALJ 1, 
however, did not determine that the lay evidence failed to 
establish Mrs. Keating's claim.  Instead, he simply decided that 
lay evidence alone was insufficient if the miner had fewer than 
ten years of coal mine employment.  
 In August 1985, Mrs. Keating filed a second claim for 
benefits, which the Department of Labor treated as a request for 
modification under 20 C.F.R. § 725.310, and denied.  In her 
request for modification, Mrs. Keating offered a newly discovered 
Anthracite Miners Certificate as evidence that ALJ 1 incorrectly 
credited her husband with fewer than ten years employment.  Mrs. 
Keating also argued that ALJ 1 mistakenly decided the ultimate 
fact, her entitlement to benefits. 
 ALJ Tierney (ALJ 2) held a hearing two years later on 
whether ALJ 1's decision should be modified.  He denied the 
modification request.  In summary fashion, ALJ 2 stated that 
6 
modification would be granted only if Mrs. Keating proved a 
mistake of fact, and added that failure to present all available 
relevant evidence at the initial hearing does not constitute a 
mistake of fact.  ALJ 2 made a conclusory statement that the "new 
evidence," the miner's certificate, was available at the time of 
the initial hearing and because Mrs. Keating testified at that 
hearing she had no basis to request modification.  He flatly 
refused to consider the significance of the miner's certificate 
and Mrs. Keating's contention that ALJ 1's finding that she was 
not entitled to benefits constituted a mistake of fact. 
 A year later the Board affirmed ALJ 2 on appeal, basically 
reiterating the ALJ's decision.  The Board acknowledged that ALJ 
2 may have erred by failing to consider the effect of the miner's 
certificate, but added that the new evidence, even if considered, 
would not support a finding of ten years of coal mine employment. 
It noted, however, that if fully credited, the miner's 
certificate would support a finding of 9 years and 8 months of 
coal mine employment.  Although Mrs. Keating clearly presented 
the issue, the Board did not consider whether ALJ 1 mistakenly 
decided the ultimate fact.  The Board operated under the 
erroneous assumption that, even though her case was filed before 
1982, without medical evidence she must show employment for at 
least ten years. 
 On June 13, 1990, Mrs. Keating once again sought proper 
consideration of her claim by filing a modification petition. ALJ 
Brown (ALJ 3) denied it one and a half years later, in February 
1992.  ALJ 3 did not consider carefully Mrs. Keating's petition 
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and ignored the fact that no judge had weighed the lay testimony 
on the deceased miner's condition.  Instead, ALJ 3 chastised the 
widow, stating the modification process "does not permit 
continuous reweighing of testimony by Judge after Judge until a 
friendly factfinder is found."    
 Mrs. Keating again appealed to the Board.  The Director this 
time agreed with Mrs. Keating that the administrative law judges 
had not properly considered her claim or modification requests, 
and filed a motion with the Board requesting remand to ALJ 3 for 
proper consideration.0  In August 1994, the Board denied the 
Director's motion and affirmed ALJ 3's decision. 
 The Board concluded that ALJ 3 found no mistake of fact and 
denied benefits.  It also opined that Mrs. Keating failed to 
argue mistake of fact.  This, however, is incorrect.  ALJ 3 
refused both to consider the evidence and to decide if there had 
been a mistake of fact.  In affirming, the Board stated that Mrs. 
Keating's arguments (first, that the evidence of record 
established her entitlement to benefits and second, that the ALJ 
made a mistake of fact) amount instead to assignments of legal 
error or mistake in law and are not proper grounds for 
modification.  Mrs. Keating now petitions for review.   
                                                           
0The Director's Brief provides: 
 
[W]e are not unmindful of the long tortured procedural 
history of this case, which has already dragged on for 
far too long.  We also accept our share of the 
responsibility for the delay, as we did not recognize 
that Keating had yet to receive a proper evaluation of 
her evidence until this case was before the Board for 
the third time. 
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II. 
 First, we must determine whether the Board erred by 
upholding ALJ 3's refusal to consider whether Mrs. Keating had 
established a mistake of fact.  It is important to note the 
purpose behind the Act in order to fully appreciate both the 
injustice to Mrs. Keating, and how the treatment of her case runs 
counter to congressional goals.  Section 901(a), 30 U.S.C., 
provides:  
It is . . . the purpose of this subchapter . . . to 
ensure that in the future adequate benefits are 
provided to coal miners and their dependents in the 
event of their death or total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis. 
The courts have repeatedly recognized that the remedial nature of 
the statute requires a liberal construction of the Black Lung 
entitlement program to ensure widespread benefits to miners and 
their dependents. Kline v. Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d 1175, 1180 
(3d Cir. 1989).  
 Under 20 C.F.R. § 718.202,0 in claims such as Mrs. Keating's 
filed before January 1, 1982, the claimant can rely solely on lay 
testimony.  As we stated in Hillibush v. United States Dept. of 
                                                           
0 Section 718.202(c), 20 C.F.R., regulates a finding of 
pneumoconiosis and provides: 
 
A determination of the existence of pneumoconiosis 
shall not be made . . . [in] a claim involving a 
deceased miner filed on or after January 1, 1982, 
solely based upon the affidavit(s) (or equivalent sworn 
testimony) of the claimant and/or his or her dependents 
who would be eligible for augmentation of the 
claimant's benefits if the claim were approved.  
See also, 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.204(c)(5) & 718.305(b). 
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Labor, Benefits Review Bd., 853 F.2d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 1988), 
citing 30 U.S.C. § 923(b), 
 Where there is no medical or other relevant 
evidence in the case of a deceased miner, such 
affidavits . . . shall be considered to be sufficient 
to establish that the miner was totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis or that his or her death was due to 
pneumoconiosis. 
 The provisions regulating the use of lay evidence in pre-
1982 cases address the difficulty of establishing an otherwise 
valid claim because of the lack of medical evidence, resulting 
from lost, destroyed, or incomplete doctor and hospital records 
or other medical evidence. See Hillibush, 853 F.2d at 204.  Mrs. 
Keating faced this precise difficulty, and three ALJ's and the 
Board on three occasions used it against her to deny her claim. 
 It is true that based on ALJ 1's finding of fewer than ten 
years of coal mine employment, Mrs. Keating is not entitled to 
the interim presumption of 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a).0  Nonetheless, 
ALJ 1 erred when he ruled that Mrs. Keating could not establish 
her claim on lay evidence alone if her husband had worked fewer 
than ten years in the coal mines. 
 On modification petitions, ALJ 2, ALJ 3, and the Board twice 
on appeal, totally ignored Mrs. Keating's argument that ALJ 1 
made a mistake of the ultimate fact -- that she was not entitled 
to benefits.  The ALJs and the Board incorrectly ruled that the 
evidence could not be reconsidered.   
  Section 725.310, 20 C.F.R., provides in pertinent part:  
                                                           
0Keating concedes that because she did not challenge the 
calculation before the Board the third time, she waived argument 
that she is entitled to the interim presumption based on ten 
years of coal mine employment. 
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  (a) Upon his or her own initiative, or upon the 
request of any party on grounds of a change in 
conditions or because of a mistake in a determination 
of fact, the deputy commissioner may, at any time 
before one year from the date of the last payment of 
benefits, or at any time before one year after the 
denial of a claim, reconsider the terms of an award or 
denial of benefits.  
  (b) . . . Additional evidence may be submitted by any 
party or requested by the deputy commissioner . . . .  
20 C.F.R. § 725.310 (a) & (b). 
  The Director interprets the modification regulation as 
allowing an ALJ to reconsider the evidence in determining whether 
there was a mistake of fact, even the ultimate fact of 
entitlement.  This is consistent with the modification 
regulation.  Moreover, O'Keeffe v. AeroJet-General Shipyards, 
Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 92 S. Ct. 405 (1971), establishes that we 
should broadly construe the modification provision.  In O'Keeffe, 
the Court interpreted the language from the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 922, which is 
incorporated into the Black Lung Benefits Act by 30 U.S.C. 
§932(a), and implemented by 20 C.F.R. § 725.310.  It found that 
on its face the modification provision permits a reopening of the 
case with no limitation on particular factual errors.  The plain 
language allows the deputy commissioner "broad discretion to 
correct mistakes of fact, whether demonstrated by wholly new 
evidence, cumulative evidence, or merely further reflection on 
the evidence initially submitted." 404 U.S. at 256, 92 S. Ct. at 
407. 
 In Jessee v. Director, OWCP, 5 F.3d 723, 725 (4th Cir. 
1993), interpreting 20 C.F.R. § 718.310, the court stated 
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a claimant may simply allege that the ultimate 
fact--disability due to pneumoconiosis--was mistakenly 
decided, and the [ALJ] may, if he so chooses, modify 
the final order on the claim.  There is no need for a 
smoking-gun factual error, changed conditions, or 
startling new evidence. 
Accord, Consolidation Coal Co. v. Worrell, 27 F.3d 227, 230 (6th 
Cir. 1994). 
 We agree with the Director that the regulation empowers an 
ALJ to make a de novo review of factual determinations on a 
modification petition.  As the Director recognizes,  
[a]t a minimum, the [ALJ] must review all evidence of 
record -- any new evidence submitted in support of 
modification, as well as the evidence previously of 
record -- and "further reflect" on whether any mistakes 
[of] fact were made in the previous adjudication of the 
case. 
 Mrs. Keating argues, and the Director agrees, that she was 
entitled to have an ALJ properly determine her request for 
modification.  ALJ 3 refused to consider her arguments, and 
contrary to O'Keeffe's instruction, protested that she was not 
entitled to have the evidence "reconsidered" on petition for 
modification.  ALJ 3 erred by refusing to render de novo factual 
findings based on the lay evidence, and the Board erred by 
affirming on appeal.   
III. 
 Mrs. Keating requests that instead of remanding for yet 
another hearing, we simply direct an award of benefits to her on 
the record.  We have done so in similar cases in which the result 
is foreordained, and will do so here.  In Sulyma v. Director, 
OWCP, 827 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1987), the issue was the medical 
evidence's sufficiency to rebut the presumption of total 
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disability resulting from pneumoconiosis.  We reversed the order 
of the Board and remanded the cause for an award of benefits, 
noting that case's protracted history.  In Kline, a case that had 
gone on for nineteen years, we likewise awarded benefits after 
concluding that the record established the claimant's entitlement 
to benefits. 
 We found remand unnecessary in Kowalchick v. Director, OWCP, 
893 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1990), after we concluded that the evidence 
could only support a finding that the claimant had established 
the presumption of disability under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1), 
stating "this is a case where the record is so clear that under 
the correct standard the result is foreordained." 893 F.2d at 621 
(internal quotations omitted).  We found that "no purpose would 
be served in remanding [the] case ... and we therefore direct[ed] 
that benefits be awarded from the appropriate commencement date." 
Id.at 624. 
 Recently, in Bethenergy Mines Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 39 
F.3d 458 (3d Cir. 1994), the Board reversed an ALJ's denial of 
benefits.  Upholding the Board's decision, we commented: 
 While the Board could have remanded the matter, we 
hardly can fault it for bringing these protracted 
proceedings to a close.  Indeed, we followed a similar 
course in Sulyma v. Director, OWCP, 827 F.2d 922, 924 
(3d Cir. 1987) . . . . [W]e would not remand the case. 
Rather, "in consideration of the age of" the case, we 
relied on our own view of the record and concluded that 
the presumption had not been rebutted.   
39 F.3d at 464. 
 We will follow the wise counsel of those cases.  This case 
has gone on far too long.  Therefore, we will review the record 
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to determine if Mrs. Keating is entitled on this record to 
survivor benefits. 
IV. 
 Although the Director concedes the credibility of the 
petitioner's witnesses, and the record shows no contrary 
evidence, the Director nonetheless maintains that the lay 
witnesses did not establish that John Keating at the time of his 
death suffered total disability resulting from pneumoconiosis 
from coal mine employment.  The Director acknowledges what the 
law provides:  that lay witnesses alone in pre-1982 cases may be 
sufficient to establish Mrs. Keating's claim, but suggests 
inferences from the lay evidence other than total disability or 
death from pneumoconiosis.  Notably, however, he fails to 
articulate just what those contrary inferences might be.  Indeed, 
we can find none. 
 Arguing against an outright award of benefits, the Director 
characterizes the evidence as merely relating the miner's 
symptoms and not establishing with specificity the physical 
requirements of the miner's usual coal mine work.  He questions 
whether the evidence of record suffices to support the required 
finding that the miner's condition prevented him from performing 
his usual coal mine work.0  We respond simply by noting that 
                                                           
0Section 718.204(b), 20 C.F.R., provides: 
 
  (b)Total disability defined . . . . [A] miner shall 
be considered totally disabled if pneumoconiosis as 
defined in section 718.201 prevents or prevented the 
miner: 
  (1)From performing his or her usual coal mine work; 
and 
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nothing other than total disability, however, can reasonably be 
inferred from the evidence in this record.  
 The Director cites to cases from other Courts of Appeals in 
which the testimony failed to prove a totally disabling 
respiratory impairment.  Those cases are inapposite.  Each case 
must be decided on its own facts, and those cases were not 
decided on testimony as compelling as that Mrs. Keating offered. 
 The Director also argues that there is no evidence linking 
the miner's respiratory impairment to his coal mine employment, 
such as "that his cough was productive of black material."  But, 
of course, there is no check list of required testimony. 
Obviously, the type of testimony considered sufficient would have 
to be short of medical testimony, otherwise lay testimony alone 
could never suffice. 
 Mrs. Keating can establish total disability resulting from 
pneumoconiosis by her affidavit or equivalent sworn testimony 
alone.  Nonetheless, in addition to her sworn testimony, Mrs. 
Keating submitted the sworn testimony and affidavits of 
individuals familiar with the miner's condition, as provided for 
by 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(b),0 and submitted the death certificate 
indicating anthracosilicosis.0  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
  (2)From engaging in gainful employment in the 
immediate area of his or her residence requiring the 
skills or abilities comparable to those of any 
employment in a mine or mines in which he or she 
previously engaged with some regularity over a 
substantial period of time. 




 This evidence establishes that at the time of his death, the 
miner was not able to perform simple tasks, such as climbing 
stairs, because of his difficulty breathing.  Most of the 
testimony involved personal observations of five individuals that 
the deceased had extreme difficulty breathing and a significant 
lack of energy.  The evidence also documented his work in the 
coal mines for almost ten years, his repeated exposure to black 
coal dust, his medical treatment for his lungs during the last 
five years of his life, his inability to work which he attributed 
to his coal mine employment, and the presence of 
anthracosilicosis.  Beyond question, Mrs. Keating established a 
record showing that the deceased suffered from pneumoconiosis 
arising from coal mine employment as required under the Act. 
 We conclude that Mrs. Keating is entitled to benefits 
because the Director concedes the lay evidence's credibility, and 
there is no contrary evidence.  At the time of John Keating's 
death, he was totally disabled as a result of pneumoconiosis from 
coal mine employment.  In light of the liberal policies behind 
the Act and the foregoing, Mrs. Keating is entitled to benefits. 
V. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
In the case of a deceased miner, where there is no 
medical or other relevant evidence, affidavits of 
persons having knowledge of the miner's condition shall 
be considered to be sufficient to establish the 
existence of a totally disabling respiratory or 
pulmonary impairment for purposes of this section. 
(Emphasis added). 
0The definition of pneumoconiosis includes anthracosilicosis. 20 
C.F.R. §§ 718.201 & 727.202. 
16 
 Accordingly, we will grant the petition for review, reverse 
the Benefits Review Board and remand the cause for the limited 
purpose of awarding benefits to Mrs. Keating from August 1978. 
